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Counter messaging has been heavily criticised, not least on the grounds of 
effectiveness. Whereas current debates are focused on the role of government and 
large organisations in developing and disseminating counter messages, this paper 
argues that such approaches overlook the informal production of counter messages. 
Recognising the appetite for ‘natural world’ content among those engaged in counter 
messaging, this paper highlights some of the potential benefits of informal 
approaches to counter messaging. At the same time, the paper also acknowledges the 
risks that may result from closer working between counter messaging organisations 







Counter messaging - communication that seeks to disrupt the messages 
disseminated by extremist groups and individuals - has become a core component of 
counter terrorism strategies. Thus far, formal programs, often directed by 
governments or civil society organisations, have dominated the discussion of counter 
messaging. This paper seeks to expand this discussion by highlighting the potential 
for informally produced counter messages to contribute to wider policy goals. The 
paper concentrates on some of the potential benefits and risks of counter messaging 
by informal actors. Informal content has the potential to be seen as more credible by 
audiences, as well as to be more aggressive in its messages, for example by isolating 
and ridiculing individual extremists and organisations. This comes at a cost, as 
informal content creates increased risk of backlash against creators, and of 
encouraging hate speech.  
 
Theoretically, this paper builds on insights from nodal governance theory that see 
security as being increasingly provided by networks that include public, private, and 
citizen actors.1 This paper is also a direct response to the move by some formal 
organisations engaged in counter messaging to use informally produced content 
rather than producing their own in-house material.2 This paper does not suggest that 
informally produced counter messages are superior to formally produced ones, or 
that informal messages can be relied upon as a substitute. However, any 
comprehensive understanding of counter messaging is incomplete without 
acknowledging the potential of content produced by informal creators, and the 
potential damage that may come from co-opting it into a formal campaign. Although 
governments have taken a hand in both directly producing counter messages, and 
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mobilising wider networks of influencers, these attempts have drawn criticism from 
both the press and political activists.3  
 
What is counter messaging?  
Counter messages seek to undermine the messages presented by extremist groups. 
Existing literature on the subject reveals a broad range of understandings and 
different terms in use. Peter Neumann, writing on potential responses to online 
radicalisation in the US, identified counter messages as a potential tactic to reduce 
demand for violent extremist material. 
 
“Broadly speaking, counter-messaging may involve challenges to the violent 
extremists’ ideology and to their political and/or religious claims; messages 
that aim to “mock, ridicule or somehow undermine their credibility”; 
contrasts between violent extremists’ grandiose claims and the reality 
and/or consequences of their actions; or positive alternatives that cancel out 
or negate the violent extremists’ ideology or lifestyle.”4 
 
Within this definition there are multiple types of message: disputing claims, 
undermining extremist groups, contrasting rhetoric and reality, and promoting 
positive alternative ideologies. Other approaches have concentrated more heavily on 
media and the delivery of messages, including making specific references to social 
media, as well as religious authority. Setting out elements of a counter messaging 





“Defeating ISIS will be a multi-faceted long-term effort to delegitimize the 
movement and undermine its radical interpretation of Islamic Law, while 
inhibiting their ability to persuade and inspire followers. As with messaging, 
effective counter-messaging is as much a technique as it is a process, and a 
counter-messaging (CM) strategy also involves a combination of written / 
oral communications, reinforced by actions and behaviors and then 
propagated through the effective use of social media.”5  
 
Other approaches have varied the terminology. In particular, narrative and counter-
narrative has been the main descriptor used in many accounts. Narrative refers to a 
set of events in sequence, and is more expansive than message, which can refer to 
isolated claims.6 Ferguson differentiates between counter narratives as a term 
deployed in the ‘CVE literature’ and ‘alternative’ strategies focusing on existing 
media and journalism, including drama.7 Even beyond message and narrative, there 
are a plurality of descriptions for activities, one report suggests the concept of ‘alter-
messaging’ focusing on ‘alternative content to the ideology of terrorism’.8 In this 
article, the use of the term counter message is intended to enable a broad analysis. 
Subsequent discussion of informal counter messages will demonstrate how diverse 
content can be. Little of the content analysed for this paper would fit the description 
of a narrative, with actors instead often focusing on specific issues as opposed to 
longer stories.  
 
One common thread in discussions of counter messaging is a lack of specificity in 
describing audiences. Leuprecht et al, for example, suggest differentiating between 
individuals who are closer to the top of the ‘pyramid’ (of radicalisation) or are likely 
to be so, and those further down who are seen as potentially at-risk.9 Neumann talks 
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about audiences that are ‘potentially vulnerable to becoming radicalised’. 10 There is 
little evidence of consideration of the impact of counter messages beyond audiences 
who may potentially be vulnerable to radicalisation, despite the impact of extremist 
messaging, most notably terrorism, on both potential victims and wider society.11  
 
Counter messaging fits broadly under the heading of countering violent extremism, a 
broad policy area that encompasses a range of activities. Harris-Hogan et al aim to 
use public health models to frame CVE for policy makers, identifying primary, 
secondary and tertiary interventions.12 Tertiary interventions seek to enable 
disengagement from violent extremist networks, for example through 
deradicalization and disengagement programs. 13  Secondary interventions aim to 
intervene where individuals are displaying ‘symptoms’ of radicalisation.14 Given that 
individuals targeted by these interventions are unlikely to have committed any 
offence secondary interventions are prone to being the most controversial. Primary 
interventions are preventative and aim through training and education to reduce the 
prevalence of violent extremism.15 Counter messaging can be seen as a form of both 
primary and secondary CVE depending on intended audiences. In many cases it is 
aimed at both those already engaged with violent extremism and those at risk of 
engagement.16 There is also further differentiation over the goals of counter 
messaging, varying between changing minds and changing behaviour.17  
 
In practice, counter messaging campaigns can manifest in many different forms, but 
analysis tends to be confined to campaigns that have some kind of formalised 
support. Examples include Abdullah-X, a cartoon avatar that features in online 
‘comics’, as well as in a series of 22 YouTube videos. Titles include The Real Meaning 
of Jihad, and Freedom of Speech vs Responsibility. The site and videos are well-
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presented, and feature references to media engagement by the content creator, 
reportedly a former extremist. The project is listed as ‘made possible by jigsaw’, an 
incubator within Google’s parent company, Alphabet. 18 No videos have been 
produced by since October 2016. The Global Survivors Network focuses on testimony 
from victims of terrorism. The network produced the documentary film Killing in the 
Name, which was nominated for an Oscar in 2011. The network also had a presence 
on YouTube, Facebook, and a website (which is now defunct). The Facebook page has 
not been updated since November 2015. A case study by the Institute for Strategic 
Dialogue describes the project as ‘seeded’ following a September 2008 UN 
symposium, with the aim of sharing victim testimonies to vulnerable communities.19 
Both of these campaigns now appear defunct, although the content they have 
produced persists online.20  
 
Critiques of counter messaging 
There have been three main related critiques of counter messaging: strategic 
effectiveness, normative, and capability-based.  
 
Much of the criticism of counter messaging has stemmed from a perceived lack of 
strategic effectiveness. This can be framed as questioning the role of messaging in 
general. The basis of this critique is that policy-makers have over-estimated the 
importance of propaganda in driving violent extremism, and therefore assume that 
the solution is to promote the alternate view. 21 Glazzard, in a paper for the 
International Counter Terrorism Centre, excoriates ‘counter-narrative theory’, noting 
the extent to which government, think tanks and advocacy organisations are 
organisationally committed to the idea and the limited evidence base.22  Other 
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critiques of effectiveness dwell on the scale of the task, suggesting that the volume of 
extremist material makes developing counter messages a drop in the ocean.23  
 
These criticisms are further compounded by the difficulties in measuring the 
effectiveness of counter messaging campaigns. Although raw metrics are often used 
to support arguments for effectiveness, knowing the final impact of exposure to 
counter messages is very difficult, particularly in a real-world setting.24 Not least 
because, depending on the intended targets of counter messaging campaigns, 
effective outcomes can be based on non-events. In the preventative space for 
example, this could mean dissuading an individual from engaging with an extremist 
organisation at all.  
 
These are valid criticisms. However, much depends on what counter messages are 
expected to achieve. Involvement in extremist organisations is dynamic and 
granular. At any one point there are multiple audiences inside and outside an 
extremist milieu. Some may be committed activists, others may be wavering, others 
still contemplating deeper engagement. There may also be potential members who 
are yet to even hear of a group, a largely indifferent public, fearful potential victims, 
and ideological opponents that may even be involved in their own forms of 
extremism. Despite an assumed ability to micro-target content, counter messaging 
campaigns are not limited to a single audience, and leakage from campaigns has the 
potential to impact unintended audiences. This potential only becomes greater when 
material is published online where it can be re-posted and remixed to different 
effects. The effects of counter messaging on these audiences are not well understood, 
but there at least needs to be a recognition that despite the stated aims of counter 
messaging campaigns, that they will impact on a variety of audiences. In addition to 
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these considerations, we might also consider the alternative of remaining silent, and 
the ramifications of allowing extremist messages to go (formally at least) 
uncontested.  
 
As well as questioning the effectiveness of counter messaging campaigns to date, 
there are deeper questions on the normative aspects government involvement. 
Although few would question the role of the government in confronting terrorism, 
the indistinct margins between radical milieus and support for violence raise 
awkward questions around the extent to which interventions are warranted.25 
Richards, for example, argues for a distinction between “extremism of thought’ and 
‘extremism’ of method’.26 Conflating non-violent ideology with violent methods is 
problematic from a policy angle, but equally distinguishing between non-violent and 
violent ideology, and crucially the trajectories between the two, is also extremely 
difficult. These nuanced and at times invisible distinctions create extremely muddy 
waters for governments looking to either counter extremist ideologies directly, or do 
so through proxies. Counter messaging sits awkwardly on the dividing line between 
legitimate counter terrorism and publicly unacceptable ideological engineering. More 
recent shifts in UK government policy, including the 2015 UK Counter Extremism 
Strategy, seem to indicate an increasing focus on extremism as opposed to violent 
extremism.27 Although this move has been criticised by the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights for an assumed ‘escalator’ between extremism and terrorism, and the 
definition of extremism.28 
 
Counter messaging runs the risk of being equated with propaganda. Propaganda has 
historically been seen in democratic states as the preserve of undemocratic 
opponents.29 In the aftermath of World War One, the term propaganda became 
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synonymous with dishonesty.30 In some accounts propaganda is used in democratic 
states either for dubious ends,31  or as part of everyday communication.32 Some make 
the case that promotional culture is now pervasive, and consequently the term 
propaganda has served its usefulness.33 Despite the normalisation of propaganda, 
recent incidents have also showcased public alarm at both CVE policy and counter 
messaging. In the UK, Prevent, a CVE strategy, has already been much maligned 
both by the press and civil society organisations on the grounds that it unfairly 
targets Muslims, causes alienation and is ultimately counter-productive.34 Focusing 
specifically on counter messaging, the Home Office-based Research Information and 
Communication Unit (RICU) was heavily criticised for their Help for Syria campaign 
which distributed leaflets and targeted student events without identifying itself as 
being government-backed.35 Clearly in this case, it was felt that acknowledging 
government involvement would immediately sour audiences on the message, but the 
revelation may have done further damage to the UK Government’s credibility, 
suggesting the campaign may even have been counter-productive. Examples of 
RICU’s work have been seized upon by anti-Prevent campaign organisations, 
including the highly partisan pressure group CAGE, which in 2016 published a report 
We Are Completely Independent, in which claims of covert government support were 
made against several campaigns. The overall tone of the report is highly critical.36 
The risks of ‘sock-puppet’ organisations, i.e. organisations claiming to be 
independent but working to advance specific agendas, have been identified as 
including worsening trust in government over time, as well as undermining the 
credibility of other organisations without official ties.37  
 
A final criticism stems from the lingering doubts about the capabilities of counter 
messaging actors to produce material that will resonate with audiences. One account 
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of counter messaging in the US identifies a ‘preachy’ tone as being a key problem 
with audiences.38 Meanwhile, governments are seen by many as having a ‘credibility 
gap’ with target audiences, and efforts to engage may be dismissed out of hand, or 
even potentially entrench extremist beliefs.39 Writing on countering ideological 
support for terrorism, Herd and Aldis argue: 
 
“This [countering ideological support for terrorism] is not an appropriate 
task for governments to undertake, but on the evidence of our case studies 
appears best carried out by indigenous religious or other civil society 
organizations. Too obvious governmental efforts in this field, too close 
cooperation with moderate religious associations within a region or state, 
will only serve to delegitimize them in the eyes of the population.”40 
 
Civil society organisations are not tainted with the same lack of credibility that 
governments are, however, civil society organisations are very often aligned with 
governments, seeking to obtain favour and resources. The perception (often 
ideologically skewed) is potentially one of a counter extremism industry, composed 
of charities, think-tanks, and other organisations, all seeking to engage with high-
priority counter-terror efforts. Schmid suggests that many civil society organisations 
are dependent on government for funding, and are staffed by employees who move 
between governmental and non-governmental organisations.41 Likewise, Tierney 
argues that, in the North American context, governments are still seen as the 
‘ultimate drivers’ of CVE efforts.42 To illustrate this point, the Abdullah X campaign 




‘With further research one realises that the connections of the “Abdullah-X” 
project reaches into the global counter-radicalisation industry which 
promotes neoconservative, Zionist aims.’43 
 
Of further concern should be the cultural background of those working in civil society 
organisations. Although the prime concern of counter messaging is ideological, this is 
likely heavily embedded within cultural practices particular to target groups. These 
can include language, customs, music and art.44 The question remains: how much 
credibility do government, and government-backed approaches, to CVE and counter 
messaging have for audiences? 
 
 
Formal and informal counter messaging 
It is fair to say that analysis of counter messaging, along with CVE more broadly, 
thus far has been focused almost entirely on organised programmes, often those with 
financial connections to government and larger NGOs. The presence of government 
funding in this space has led to a focus on discrete programs undertaken by 
identifiable organisations with measurable outcomes.45 The need to justify the use of 
public money and measure success funnels funding to programmes that can produce 
measurable results.46 This focus on formal programmes risks ignoring some of the 
most potentially useful contributions to counter messaging.  
 
 
In contrast to the current academic and policy fixation, much counter messaging 
work is done informally by citizens with no connection with government security 
policy or any wider community organisations. At the micro-level this means 
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conversations with friends and family, discussions around the dinner table, in clubs, 
community centres, and in the back-rooms of pubs. Research based in Indonesia has 
highlighted the informal role of women in challenging extremism, suggesting that 
they constitute an important resource that has been allowed to go ‘under the radar’.47 
Although these micro counter messages remain difficult to access, the ease and 
availability of digital communication platforms has resulted in a corpus of readily 
accessible counter messages in formats including video and social media accounts. In 
effect, alongside government and NGO efforts at counter messaging, there is an 
informal sector of actors producing digital content that is critical of extremist 
messages. Based on the existing criticism of government-aligned counter messaging, 
there is good reason to believe that informal counter messages are likely to differ 
significantly from more formalised approaches to counter messaging.  
 
Probably the most infamous example of informal messaging in the UK emerged 
following a 2011 demonstration by the counter jihadist street group the English 
Defence League. At the event, Press TV interviewed a (possibly drunk) EDL 
supporter during the demonstration asking why he was protesting. His reply was 
garbled and slurred. One reference, possibly to ‘Islamic rape gangs’, was heard as 
‘muslamic ray guns’, and this became the hook of a music video created by auto-
tuning the original interview.48 The resulting video, produced by Alex Vegas, 
attracted over 1.9 million views. The song, and the phrase became a running joke at 
the expense of the EDL and is available to buy as a t-shirt. Defending himself in the 
comment section of the original video, creator Alex Vegas said: “All I did was make 




While Muslamic Ray Guns serves as perhaps the best known, there are additional 
examples of counter messaging which have received less attention. The YouTube 
channel Veedu Vids was established in 2015 with the motto ‘let’s beat bigotry with a 
smile’. At the time of writing the channel has over 2,300 subscribers, and features 30 
videos ranging from one minute 30 seconds, to 6 minutes and 45 seconds long. The 
videos deal primarily with topics around Islam and Islamist extremist narratives and 
speakers, but also features some videos focusing on ‘alt-light’ figure Milo 
Yiannopoulous, as well as controversial evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins. 
Titles include ISIS Appeal: Don’t mock ISIS; Milo Yiannopoulos VS Anjem 
Choudary: Is Islam compatible with the West?; and Zakir Naik: Are Nursery 
Rhymes Halal? (PARODY). Videos tend to focus on parody and imitation with the 
protagonist (presumably the channel owner) taking on all the roles in short sketches. 
An early video – Abu Haleema Trailer (PARODY) centres on a montage of shots set 
to music (Carmina Burana) in which the protagonist seemingly imitates the London-
based militant Islamist Abu Haleema. The parody of Haleema featured his trademark 
beard and hand gestures. Haleema rose to some prominence following a Channel 
Four Documentary – The Jihadis Next Door – which followed Haleema through 
various legal troubles and gave some insight into the production of YouTube videos. 
Despite the media exposure, Abu Haleema’s now seemingly deleted YouTube account 
had around 1,600 subscribers (in early 2017).   
 
In addition to video, social media accounts have also been a source of informal 
counter messaging. In some cases these can take the form of parody accounts such as 
‘Britain Furst’, a successful Facebook page parodying the far-right group Britain 
First.49 The page specialised in developing alternative versions of the Facebook 
memes that helped to popularise Britain First on social media. Other social media 
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presences are more straightforward in their opposition such as Exposing Britain 
First, which has accounts on multiple social networks, and the Facebook group 
Muslims against Daesh. One important caveat on these examples is the tendency of 
government and society actors to conceal the source of counter messaging 
campaigns. Given these practices, it is not possible to say for certain that any of these 
examples constitutes genuine counter messaging and is not a component of a 
broader government or civil society initiative.  
 
 
The potential for formal and informal collaboration 
Despite the inherent murkiness on the communications environment, at this 
juncture there is little evidence of coordination between formal and informal counter 
messaging. However, the informal sector has been identified as a potential source of 
content that could be co-opted by formal organisations. A 2016 report by the 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a prominent counter extremism organisation, 
recommended that ‘natural world’ content could be used to get around the 
bottlenecks presented by the need to create high-quality original content.50 A later 
report on the extreme-right also argued for greater counter-culture specific 
knowledge: 
 
‘They [counter speech measures] must penetrate alternative platforms and 
burst extreme-right bubbles with campaigns that build on a thorough 
understanding of internet culture and counter-cultures.’51  
 
Likewise, the Jigsaw-backed ‘Re-direct method’ advises against the creation of 




‘Campaigns to confront online extremism don’t necessitate new content 
creation. The best part of the research beyond identifying ISIS’s recruiting 
narratives and the content categories most likely to debunk them was that it 
surfaced hundreds of online videos in English and Arabic that were already 
uploaded to YouTube, and that would not be be [sic] rejected outright by our 
target audience.’52 
 
There is also a strong theoretical case for building closer ties between formal and 
informal content creators. Closer cooperation between security practitioners and 
private citizens has been identified as a possible model of security provision. In a 
cyber-security context, nodal governance models have been applied as tools for 
analysing the actions of citizens who have used technology to take on the role of 
criminal investigators.53 The concept has also been directly applied to a citizen-led 
terrorism investigation. The investigation into the 2013 Boston marathon bombing 
initiated by a number of ‘digilantes’ using the social media site Reddit provided 
examples of ad-hoc organisation, deployment of specialist resources to analyse the 
devices used, and crowdsourced investigations into the identities of suspects.54 
Ultimately, the Reddit-based investigation earned some interest from the FBI, but 
identified the wrong suspect. Nevertheless, the Reddit affair stands as an example 
not only of the public’s willingness to use technology to intervene in security matters, 





‘…the proverbial genie is out of the bottle: the Internet has created an 
environment in which the public can and will choose to play a role in public 
criminal and other investigations that capture its interest.’55  
 
Nodal security frameworks identify individual actors or groups – nodes – which then 
form networks, each node able to apply its own capital to a collective problem.56 
Capital can include technology, political and social relationships, and resources.57 In 
the case of the investigation into the Boston Marathon Bombing, Reddit users were 
observed to contribute specialist knowledge to the investigation, as well as to pick 
through media (e.g. photographs) associated with the attacks.58 Applying this 
framework to counter messaging, informal content creators bring both symbolic 
capital, in the form of legitimacy, social capital through their relationships with 
audiences, and cultural capital stemming from the content they produce. When 
combined with the critiques of existing formal counter messaging the benefits of 
informally produced counter messages, in the form of credibility and content, 




The leading critique of formalised counter messaging has been credibility. This 
applies both to direct communication by government, and to indirect attempts to 
gain influence through allied groups.59 Literature on online persuasive 
communication emphasises the importance of source credibility in persuasiveness.60 
Analysing the evidence on persuasive communication online, Wathen & Burkell 
identified 26 factors under five headings: source, receiver, message, medium, and 
context, that could affect persuasion.61 They further argued that credibility was a 
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multi-dimensional concept, composed primarily of perceptions of a source’s 
“trustworthiness” and “expertise”, but also including the source’s presentation 
(dynamism, likeability and goodwill).  
 
Source credibility factors can also interact with aspects of the message itself. Where 
persuasive messages differ extensively from already held beliefs, the persuasive effect 
of messages can be reduced.62 This confirms more theoretical accounts which have 
long held that successful persuasive attempts are ones that work with established 
attitudes, rather than directly contradicting them.63 Persuasive materials that were 
too firmly rooted in the interests of the message originator, and not the audience, 
were unlikely to find favour. Analysis of US attempts at countering misinformation 
has raised the problem of a ‘the credibility deficit opened up by the tension between 
rhetoric and practice in the US War of Ideas’.64 For many audiences, supporting, 
being insufficiently critical of, or failing to address government policy, is likely to be a 
turn off.   
 
In contrast, audiences may be making different judgements about source credibility 
in response to content from informal actors than formally aligned ones. Whereas 
formal counter messaging risks being labelled as biased, or out of touch, informal 
actors can present themselves as free from bias (at least bias towards the government 
line), and more in touch with their audiences. In part, some of this credibility may 
come from accepting assumptions that are incompatible with government support, 
for example conservative religious positions, or attitudes towards foreign policy. 
Given the scope and scale of the potential counter messaging space, the most credible 
spokespeople are unlikely to align themselves with formal counter messaging 





Schmid has suggested that being one-step removed from government allows civil 
society organisations greater leeway in terms of the content that they produce.65 In 
the informal counter messaging space there are no checks and no standards. Counter 
messages produced by non-aligned actors are free to include personal attacks on 
specific individuals, use humour, and even sympathise explicitly with extreme 
political views. One potential strategy is to discredit violent extremist organisations, 
or to target individual extremists for ridicule.66 This strategy may be difficult for 
larger organisations to engage with without being perceived as bullying, and risking 
adding legitimacy to extreme actors by acknowledging them and their claims. Some 
researchers have called for a more robust approach to content creation to match the 
content produced by extreme groups i.e. ‘to fight fire with fire’.67 
 
As well as the freedom to produce coarser content, informal counter messaging 
actors are also free to experiment with different forms of content. While internet 
memes have come to mean something different from the original use of the term 
meme, the idea of harnessing the power of seemingly ephemeral trends to sway the 
public mind has been advocated by several campaigners.68 Memes, according to 
Shifman, are characterised by three factors: they spread through interpersonal 
contact but influence wider culture, they reproduce through imitation but not 
through exact replication, and they compete for survival with one another.69 In the 
past, the concept of meme warfare has also found favour with anti-corporate groups. 
Kalle Lasn used the term ‘meme wars’ and ‘meme warriors’ to set out his vision of a 
second, anti-corporate, American revolution. Mainstream political parties have 
copied the form, if not the underlying philosophy of memes in their production of 
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online political posters designed to be shared on social media platforms such as 
Facebook.70  
 
Meme-inspired approaches may also have value for counter messaging, Laura Huey 
analysed the production of messages on the social media platform Twitter during the 
2015 kidnap of two Japanese citizens by ISIS. Huey highlights the satirical nature of 
‘political jams’ by focusing on the trend of responding to the videoed ransom demand 
by reconfiguring images to show the kidnappers and the hostages in various absurd 
situations: serving sushi, carving kebab meat, and reversing the position of 
kidnappers and hostages.71 In particular, Huey identifies the role of these images as 
allowing audiences to respond to fear with humour. Muslamic ray guns has also 
arguably attained the status of a meme.  
 
In contrast. where government backed communication has attempted to replicate 
this style of communication it has been less successful. A video produced by the 
Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, in the US State Department 
called Run, Don’t Walk to ISIS land, featured footage produced by ISIS itself, 
including executions. The tone of the video was sarcastic, intended to highlight the 
hypocrisy of ISIS’s behaviour, in particular its treatment of Muslims. The video 
provoked a public backlash, criticised on the successful HBO show Last Week 
Tonight as ‘ironic propaganda’.72 The ensuing criticism caused the Centre to change 
direction, limiting themselves to a more fact-based approach to counter messaging.73   
 
Collaboration and risk 
On paper, there is much to gain from greater collaboration between formal and 
informal content creators. However, it is not clear what form any formalised support 
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for informal counter messaging actors would take. It may be possible that strategies 
such as the re-direct method intend to co-opt content produced by others, promoting 
it through paid advertising, without building any more concrete relationship with 
creators. Alternative models could theoretically range from building loose 
relationships, provision of tools and training, to incorporating content creators into 
existing organisations. However, any closer working would entail risk. These risks 
can be further divided into four types: personal risks, risks to targets, strategic risks, 
and reputational risks.  
 
Firstly, informal actors are often getting down and rolling in the mud with extreme 
political actors and groups. In highly localised contexts they may risk their own 
safety, for example one video in which the protagonist confronts Abu Haleema and 
challenges his messages, the protagonist is clearly concerned for his safety. The 
protagonist is audibly nervous, and the video is filmed entirely from the protagonist’s 
point of view whilst concealing his identity.74 The channel the video is posted on 
contains only that one video and there is no further way to contact the author. In 
addition to physical security, non-aligned actors also open themselves up to 
responses from extreme actors online. Veedu Vidz composed a video in which he 
responded to negative comments received online. Comments included: ‘Son of a 
bitch, everyone start reporting this arsehole production’.  
 
A second risk is the risk to specific targets of content. Parody videos of Abu Haleema 
for example stimulated dehumanising language in comments sections, and calls for 
his death. This risk can be, at least in part, be viewed as being a component of 
reciprocal radicalisation or cumulative extremism. This is the hypothesised 
interaction between extreme political and religious groups, in which different forms 
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of extremism fuel each other.75 Content designed to ridicule extreme political and 
religious positions, in particular content that singles out individuals, may raise 
tensions within communities and contribute to escalations in the form of either 
rhetoric or violence.76 Analysis of counter messages posted on the social networking 
site Facebook, for example, found a high proportion of ‘non-constructive counter 
speech’ on some pages.77 The trend for some extreme movements to present 
themselves as moderate opposition groups to other extreme movements is another 
good illustration of this problem.78 The dividing line between counter message, and 
in some cases hate speech, is heavily trafficked, and the difference between counter 
speech and provocation is not always immediately apparent.   
 
The third risk plays out on a broader strategic level. Isolation and distance from 
wider society has been seen as a potential factor in the move towards violence among 
some groups. Everton’s analysis of the Hamburg cell for example uses the concept of 
socio-cultural tension as a factor in network closure: the hiving off of extreme 
clusters of actors in networks into their own echo chambers.79 Counter messaging 
risks exacerbating and increasing the sense of isolation for those already engaging 
with extreme groups. While the intention to ‘de-cool’ extreme groups may be viable 
for those who have not yet engaged, for others that already identify with extreme 
groups, or who are already actively involved, then ridicule will likely do little to 
persuade them to desist. This contrast is a good example of the complexities of CVE. 
In this instance one form of CVE – primary counter messaging – could well 
negatively impact secondary and tertiary CVE – attempts to either persuade extreme 




Finally, the value of informal counter messaging content is precisely its perceived 
distance from a broader policy agenda. Closer working relationships raise similar 
risks to closer working between government and civil society: that informal creators 
will be branded as cogs in the wider CVE machine by audiences. While the 
investigatory capacity of citizen actors in the Reddit affair was relatively stable even 
during their involvement with the authorities, the source credibility enjoyed by 
informal counter messaging actors is much more likely to be damaged as a result of 
collaboration, or even unwitting co-option, by more ‘establishment’ agencies. There 
is the risk that harnessing counter messaging produced by informal actors will risk 
damaging the effectiveness of content itself.  
 
Reputational risk also goes both ways. While government-backed counter messages 
need to serve government policy, informal actors have unknown motivations, and 
may even be actively hostile to wider CVE policy agendas. In some cases, content 
may not be produced for explicitly political ends, but instead it may emerge from a 
range or mixture of motivations, including commercial gain and entertainment. 
Father Daughter Ad, produced by long running US comedy institution Saturday 
Night Live, is arguably an example of counter messaging content produced for 
commercial ends.80 In other cases those creating counter messaging content may be 
closer to agents of chaos. Interviews with an actor on a social media account mocking 
the far-right, reveals that they were motivated by ‘shits and giggs’ rather than by any 
political conviction.81 Even where content is produced for political ends, this does not 
mean that the ideological outlook of activists producing the content is compatible 
with collaboration with state-backed agencies. Consider for example anti-fascist 
movements which can be simultaneously opposed to far-right extremism, but equally 
committed to opposition to unjust state practices. For example, Unite Against 
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Fascism has been critical of the Prevent strategy which, it argues, ‘places an eye of 
suspicion’ on Muslim communities.82 
 
Conclusions    
There will always be ambiguity surrounding the effectiveness of counter messaging 
as a tool for challenging violent extremism. Primarily, the challenges of counter 
messages come from the indistinct audiences. Although some level of targeting is 
possible, there is no way to know if exposure to counter messages serves to reduce 
future involvement in violent extremism. Despite this, challenging the narratives of 
violent extremists remains a policy goal. In the UK, the government has invested 
significant resources into supporting counter messaging both by large civil society 
actors as well as from smaller community groups.  
 
The analysis here is inevitably focused only on mediated communication because it is 
accessible to a researcher outside of the space. This analysis does not include the 
work being undertaken beneath this level in families and communities. The primary 
argument of this paper is that, in addition to this acknowledged level of counter 
messaging, there exists an informal level of non-professionals creating counter 
messaging content. In some cases actors are likely just speaking their minds and 
have little idea of how the content they produce may align (or not) with broader 
policy goals. What’s more, given the proximity of these creators to potential 
audiences, and the lack of restrictions on the content they produce, there is the 
possibility that informal counter messaging content may differ from government-
supported content. This paper has suggested that, in some cases, the independence 
of informal actors compared to government aligned ones may boost their credibility. 
Not only are informal actors more independent, but they are likely to be seen as more 
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authentic by audiences. Key examples have also raised the possibility of content 
based around memes, humour, and personal attacks that may become harder the 
more bureaucratised content creation becomes. Equally, official content is ultimately 
tied to policy goals and societal norms that many members of target audiences, not 
just violent extremists, reject.  
 
The price for this edgier and potentially more influential content, is risk. Non-aligned 
counter messaging creates risks for both actors and their targets. Ridiculing an 
extreme figure or group may potentially inflame tensions and risks giving support to 
opposed extreme views, even where authors do not intend it. Likewise, ‘de-cooling’ 
extreme groups may work for those in the audience that are yet to engage, but it may 
risk further alienating those already involved. Research on group radicalisation 
suggests that isolation from wider social networks may be a factor in the move 
towards violence. For some audiences, informal counter messaging may be 
counterproductive.  
 
There are good theoretical and practical reasons to expect that officially aligned 
organisations may move to co-opt at least some informal content. Citizen actors, 
supported by communications technology, are free to bring their own resources to 
bear on problems, and state agents are likewise able to make use of these. The nodal 
governance argument is, however, heavily dependent on actors sharing goals which 
may not always be the case for counter messaging actors. Also, the resources of 
informal counter messaging actors, specifically their credibility and their free-
wheeling content, may not be appreciated or survive in organisations that need to 




Finally, it is worth considering the policy ramifications of this research area. 
Although it is tempting to speculate about the potential for informal content to inject 
fresh life into officially recognised counter messaging efforts, more research is 
needed to better understand the experience of informal counter messaging actors, 
whatever they may call themselves. Specifically of interest are their motivations and 
how they see themselves in relation to questions of extremism, terrorism, and policy. 
Although there is clearly interest from some groups in co-opting ‘natural’ content, no 
one has asked how content producers would feel about this. It’s also not clear what 
level of support can be offered if the benefits of informal activism are to be preserved. 
At what point will informal content become similarly inauthentic?  These risks need 
to be understood and managed if closer working is to serve wider policy aims.  
 
Perhaps a more important point however is to remind ourselves of the inevitability of 
counter messaging. Extreme groups are by definition in the minority. Societies will 
always react negatively to extreme messages, and given the tools to express their 
opinions some citizens will do so. Furthermore, it is likely that counter messaging 
content is regulated to some extent by the size of perceived threats. Where extreme 
content goes viral and breaks into mainstream networks, then members of those 
networks will respond. Where extreme content remains confined to obscure 
networks of supporters, then there will be fewer critical responses created. Informal 
counter messaging exists in equilibrium with extremist messaging, regardless of 
government policy.   
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